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REGENT DECISIONS
Torts - Liability of a Business Visitor for Negligence - Plaintiff, a
minor, was severely burned while attempting to extinguish a fire caused
by the burning of gasoline, negligently spilled by the defendant's driver
during delivery to a filling station. Defendant contended that as a
business visitor it owed no duty to the plaintiff, a mere licensee or
social guest, with respect to an open and visible condition of the land.
Since the defendant was a business visitor, it was entitled to the same
immunities from liability as the occupier of the land. Held: A business
visitor upon the premises is not relieved of liability for negligent acts
beyond the scope of his business purposes. Murdich v. Standard Oil
Company,90 N.E. (2d) 859 (Ohio, 1950).
The question presented is the liability of a business visitor to third
person licensees injured upon the premises of the common invitor as
a result of the business visitor's negligence in pursuit of its business
purpose.
The majority opinion in the instant case seems to base its decision
on the assumption that once the business visitor acted in a negligent
manner, it acted outside the scope of its business function and therefore was directly liable to anyone injured as a consequence of its negligence. In the general law of negligence, it is established that where a
man undertakes a particular course of action, he is under a duty to
act with reasonable care, and if he fails to exercise that degree of
caution which the law requires, he is liable to others for injuries caused
by his negligent acts.' The law imposes the duty on everyone to avoid
acts dangerous to others,2 and it has been held that one is liable for
negligence resulting in injury to another lawfully in a situation to be
3
dependent upon the former's conduct.
The minority view in the instant case holds that mere negligence
on the part of a business visitor in the pursuit of its business purpose
does not put an end to its business status. It is established law that
one invited upon the land of another for a business purpose is in the
lawful exercise of a right superior to that of a trespasser or licensee
and has the same immunities from liability as the owner or occupier.4
From this premise, the minority seems to reason as follows: A licensee
must accept the premises as he finds them5 and an owner of land owes
only the duty to abstain from willful and wanton conduct injurious to

I Flint and Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503, 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 924 (1906).

2 Bright v. Barnett and Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418, 26 L.R.A. 524
(1894).
3 Lawton v. Waite, 103 Wis. 244, 79 N.W. 321, 45 L.R.A. 616 (1899).
445 C.J. 787, sec. 191.

5 Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834 (1920).
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the licensee and, to warn the latter of hidden traps and defects known
to the owner.0 Hence, it would appear that where the injury sustained
by the licensee was not caused by willful or wanton conduct on the
part of the business visitor in pursuit of its business purpose," or
where the injury sustained was not caused by a hidden trap or defect
resulting from the business visitor's negligence,8 there was no breach
of a duty owed by the business visitor to the licensee.
Irrespective of the alleged immunities. from liability which the
business visitor enjoys in the course of its business function, it had
been held that it is liable for its negligent act even though the Act was
not a wanton wrong. In the case of Dennehy v. Jordan Marsh Company,10 it was held that a business visitor may be found liable to one
who has been injured while rightfully on the premises of another where
the premises have been rendered unsafe because of the negligent manner in which goods were delivered there by the business visitor's
employees.
The only Wisconsin case found with a fact situation similar to
the instant Ohio case is Campbell v. Sutliff." The plaintiff in this case
on the invitation of his hotel host, was walking through a poorly lighted
area of a garage used "for storage of the hotel guests' autos to obtain
his own auto when he stepped into an open manhole and sustained
injury. It was discovered that a coal dealer's employees after making a
delivery of coal, had negligently failed to cover the manhole into which
coal had been placed. The court found the coal dealer liable for injuries proximately caused by negligence in not leaving the premises
in as safe a condition as found. This case can be distinguished from
the Murdich case in that in the latter the party injured was a licensee
to whom the occupier of the premises owed the duty to refrain from
willful and wanton conduct injurious to the licensee, not to create any
traps or hidden defects, and to use reasonable care in carrying on activities upon the premises. In the Wisconsin case the party injured
was an invitee to whom the invitor owed the duty of keeping the
premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Wisconsin court seemed
to reach its decision on the ground that although the invitor could
have been liable because the premises were not in a safe condition,
the premises were made unsafe by the negligence of a business visitor,
2
and the latter could also be held liable therefore.'
OComeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588, 92 A.L.R. 1002 (1934). See
7 38 Am. Jur. 765, sec. 104-105.
Downes v. Elmira Bridge Co.,
8

41 App. Div. 339, 58 N.Y.S. 628 (1899).
Blackstone v. Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321, 49 N.E. 635 (1898).
9Meyers v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 165 F. (2d) 642 (6th cir., 1948).
1ODennehy v. Jordan Marsh Co., 321 Mass. 78, 71 N.E. (2d) 758 (1947).
Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
Restatement of Torts, Section 213. "A business visitor is entitled to expect
that the possessor will take reasonable care to discover the actual conditions

19511

RECENT DECISIONS

Insofar as everyone has the duty to refrain from negligent conduct resulting in injury to another, it seems that a business visitor,
negligent in pursuit of its business purpose resulting in injury to a
licensee, should not be immuned from liability solely because his invitor is not liable to the party injured. It is now recognized law that
anyone conducting an activity upon the premises has the duty to use
reasonable care.' 3 Where a business visitor fails to use reasonable
care in the pursuit of its business purpose, it should be liable for any
injuries resulting from its negligence, sustained by one who had a
right to be on the premises.
JoHN

A. FORMELLA

Labor Law - Conflict Between State and Federal Jurisdiction - Under a directive issued by the National War Labor Board on February
20, 1945, the Plankinton Packing Company entered into a maintenance
of membership agreement with the Packing House Workers of America, C.I.O. Local #50. By the terms of this agreement, all employees
who were members of the Union on March 9, 1945, and all employees
who became members after that date, were required to maintain their
union membership as a condition of employment. On March 6, 1945,
William Stokes resigned from the Union. Immediately union officers
and men began a course of conduct intended to intimidate and to coerce
Stokes, and to bring about his discharge from the company. On May 9,
1945, this was accomplished and Stokes was released. A hearing was
held before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, and on December 6, 1946, an order was issued directing the Plankinton Company
to reinstate Stokes and to reimburse him for the amount of his lost
wages. On appeal to the Milwaukee Circuit Court this holding was reversed on the grounds that the W.E.R.B. was without jurisdiction. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court, and upheld the
jurisdiction of the W.E.R.B. Held: Reversed, per curiam decision.
Plankinton Packing Company v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, William Stokes, and Local #50, United Packing House Workers of America, C.LO., 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950) .
This case presents another in a recent line of cases, many of which
have arisen in Wisconsin, involving the question of a conflict in jurisdiction between the state and federal governments under State Employment Relations Acts, the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor
og the property and either make it safe or warn him of its dangerous

condition."
13
Restatement of Torts, sec. 341, Prosser on Torts, p. 630.
'The judgment is reversed. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board,

